Phase 7 Sprint 7.1 - Federation Architecture

Summary

Introduced a formal signed evidence bundle contract and proof-of-origin verification flow for SpectraStrike federation.

Threat Model

• Federation payloads are untrusted until signature verification succeeds.

Attack Vectors Considered

• Origin spoofing.
• Signature forgery.
• Hidden unvalidated fields.

Mitigations Implemented

• Dedicated federation schema package with strict field allow-list.
• Canonical message hash and Ed25519 signature verification.
• Verification API integrated into telemetry gateway, protected by service identity auth.

Residual Risk

• Replay/freshness constraints are limited to current signature input and can be tightened with explicit replay cache for bundle endpoint.

Future Improvements

• Introduce replay nonce registry specifically for federation verify endpoint.

Architecture Diagram

flowchart LR
  SS[SpectraStrike]
  GW[Telemetry Gateway Federation Verify API]
  SCH[SignedEvidenceBundle Schema]
  VFY[Ed25519 Proof-of-Origin Verifier]
  AUD[Tamper-Evident Audit Log]

  SS --> GW
  GW --> SCH
  SCH --> VFY
  VFY --> AUD