VectorVue Security Expansion Appendix

Military-Grade Hardening & Secure Federation Roadmap

Author: José María Micoli Classification: Internal / Strategic Status: Expansion Post-SpectraStrike Integration

PHASE 0 — CRITICAL REMEDIATION (DECOUPLING & RISK REMOVAL)

Sprint 0.1 — Telemetry Capability Removal from Client API

VV-0.1.1 Identify Insecure Telemetry Endpoints

• Audit all API routes under /api/telemetry
• Trace middleware handling ingestion logic
• Identify shared secrets between SpectraStrike and VectorVue
• Commit:
  • audit(api): locate telemetry ingestion endpoints

VV-0.1.2 Remove Telemetry Routes

• Delete ingestion controllers
• Remove payload validators
• Remove telemetry DTO models
• Commit:
  • refactor(api): remove telemetry ingestion routes

VV-0.1.3 Remove Shared Authentication Paths

• Remove operator tokens from auth service
• Invalidate active API keys
• Rotate secrets in secret manager
• Commit:
  • security(auth): revoke shared operator credentials

VV-0.1.4 Database Cleanup

• Remove ingestion staging tables
• Remove foreign keys tied to ingestion pipeline
• Commit:
  • db(cleanup): drop telemetry staging tables

VV-0.1.5 Security Validation

• Confirm no public endpoint accepts POST telemetry
• Run attack surface scan
• Gate:
  • Security review required

PHASE 1 — SECURE TELEMETRY GATEWAY (NEW SERVICE)

Sprint 1.1 — Service Bootstrapping

VV-1.1.1 Create New Microservice Repo

• Name: vectorvue-telemetry-gateway
• Private network only
• Commit:
  • chore(init): bootstrap telemetry gateway service

VV-1.1.2 Implement mTLS Enforcement

• Generate internal CA
• Enforce client cert validation
• Reject unsigned clients
• Commit:
  • feat(security): enforce mTLS client authentication

VV-1.1.3 Certificate Pinning

• Store SpectraStrike public cert fingerprint
• Validate handshake fingerprint
• Commit:
  • feat(security): add certificate pinning

Sprint 1.2 — Payload Security Layer

VV-1.2.1 Ed25519 Signature Verification

• Validate payload signature
• Reject unsigned payloads
• Commit:
  • feat(validation): implement payload signature verification

VV-1.2.2 Replay Protection

• Add nonce store (Redis)
• Enforce timestamp window (±30s)
• Commit:
  • feat(security): add replay attack protection

VV-1.2.3 Rate Limiting

• Limit per Operator ID
• Detect burst anomalies
• Commit:
  • feat(rate-limit): enforce operator rate limiting

Security Gate:

• Must reject forged payload
• Must reject expired timestamp
• Must reject reused nonce

PHASE 2 — MESSAGE QUEUE ISOLATION

Sprint 2.1 — Queue Layer

VV-2.1.1 Introduce Secure Queue (Kafka/NATS)

• Internal-only network
• No public exposure
• Commit:
  • infra(queue): deploy secure telemetry queue

VV-2.1.2 Dead Letter Queue

• Route malformed events
• Commit:
  • feat(queue): add dead letter handling

VV-2.1.3 Integrity Hashing

• Add SHA-256 checksum per message
• Commit:
  • feat(integrity): add message integrity hashing

PHASE 3 — TELEMETRY PROCESSING ENGINE

Sprint 3.1 — Schema Enforcement

VV-3.1.1 Strict JSON Schema Validation

• Define canonical telemetry schema
• Reject additional properties
• Commit:
  • feat(schema): enforce strict telemetry schema

VV-3.1.2 MITRE Mapping Validation

• Validate TTP codes
• Commit:
  • feat(validation): validate MITRE ATT&CK mappings

Sprint 3.2 — Sanitization & Isolation

VV-3.2.1 Input Sanitization

• Escape HTML/JS
• Block injection patterns
• Commit:
  • security(input): sanitize telemetry fields

VV-3.2.2 Tenant Mapping Enforcement

• Map event to tenant via signed metadata
• Commit:
  • feat(multitenancy): enforce strict tenant mapping

Security Gate:

• Attempt cross-tenant injection
• Attempt corrupted schema
• Attempt SQL injection via telemetry

PHASE 4 — CRYPTOGRAPHIC HARDENING

Sprint 4.1 — Field-Level Encryption

VV-4.1.1 Encrypt Evidence Blobs

• Envelope encryption
• Per-tenant keys
• Commit:
  • feat(crypto): implement envelope encryption for evidence

VV-4.1.2 HSM Integration

• Store root keys in HSM
• Commit:
  • feat(crypto): integrate HSM key management

PHASE 5 — ZERO TRUST INTERNAL ARCHITECTURE

Sprint 5.1 — Service Identity

VV-5.1.1 Service-to-Service mTLS

• Each microservice has identity cert
• Commit:
  • security(zero-trust): enforce service identity authentication

VV-5.1.2 Remove Shared Secrets

• Replace env secrets with cert-based trust
• Commit:
  • refactor(security): remove shared service secrets

PHASE 6 — TAMPER-EVIDENT LOGGING

Sprint 6.1 — Immutable Logging

VV-6.1.1 Append-Only Logs

• Append-only logs enabled
• Commit:
  • feat(logging): implement append-only audit log

VV-6.1.2 Hash Chain Logging

• Each log references previous hash
• Commit:
  • feat(logging): implement hash chain integrity

VV-6.1.3 Log Sealing

• Periodic snapshot sealing
• Commit:
  • feat(logging): implement periodic log sealing

Security Gate:

• Attempt log tampering
• Attempt deletion

PHASE 7 — FEDERATION PROTOCOL (SpectraStrike ↔ VectorVue)

Sprint 7.1 — Federation Spec Definition

VV-7.1.1 Define Signed Evidence Bundle Format

• Fields:
  • operator_id
  • campaign_id
  • execution_hash
  • timestamp
  • nonce
  • signature
• Commit:
  • feat(federation): define signed evidence bundle schema

VV-7.1.2 Proof-of-Origin Verification

• Proof-of-origin verification implemented
• Commit:
  • feat(federation): implement proof-of-origin verification

PHASE 8 — SECURITY CI/CD ENFORCEMENT

Sprint 8.1 — Security Gates in Pipeline

VV-8.1.1 Static Code Analysis

• Add dedicated security workflow stage for static analysis
• Commit:
  • ci(security): add SAST pipeline stage

VV-8.1.2 Dependency Scanning

• Add dependency vulnerability scanner to security workflow
• Commit:
  • ci(security): add dependency vulnerability scanning

VV-8.1.3 Security Regression Tests

• Enforce policy gate and regression test suite in CI
• Commit:
  • ci(security): enforce security regression suite

Pipeline must fail if:

• mTLS disabled
• Signature validation bypassed
• Tenant boundary test fails

PHASE 9 — FULL SYSTEM RED TEAM VALIDATION

Sprint 9.1 — Attack Simulation Against System

Simulate:

• Replay attacks
• Signature forgery
• MITM attempt
• Cross-tenant access
• Log tampering
• Queue poisoning
• Rate limit exhaustion

Commit:

• test(redteam): add full-system attack simulation suite

Security Gate:

• Must pass before production promotion

FINAL STATE REQUIREMENTS

VectorVue must:

• Never expose ingestion publicly
• Enforce cryptographic federation
• Isolate tenants cryptographically
• Use zero-trust service model
• Maintain tamper-evident logs
• Reject unsigned telemetry
• Reject replayed telemetry
• Enforce strict schema
• Protect evidence via envelope encryption
• Pass internal red-team validation

INTEGRATION TEST CHECKPOINTS

You may test SpectraStrike ↔ VectorVue only after:

• Phase 1 complete (Gateway hardened)
• Phase 3 complete (Processing isolation)
• Phase 5 complete (Zero trust enforced)

Full production federation allowed only after:

• Phase 9 red-team validation passes

END OF APPENDIX